Having established the powers and scope of the legislative and executive branches, Hamilton turns to the third branch of government: the judiciary. At issue are three major concerns: how judges are appointed; how long judges will serve; and how judicial authority is apportioned between different federal courts.

Federal judges will be appointed, like other federal officers, by the President with Senate approval. These judges will remain in office for as long as they choose, assuming poor behavior does not occasion their impeachment. These indefinite terms are no cause for alarm, Hamilton writes, because the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or the purse” and has “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment” (395). While some claim that the judiciary’s power to render the laws of Congress void gives it superior power, Hamilton argues that it is not the judiciary that may render a law void; it is the Constitution—which is itself an expression of the people and their rights—that does so, with the judiciary merely speaking on the people’s behalf. Moreover, permanent tenure for judges helps assure that they will be independent in their judgments. Finally, Hamilton believes that the number of individuals with the integrity and knowledge needed to serve as judges is so small that it would be inadvisable to replace them with much frequency.