Hamilton states that the powers of national defense—raising armies, building fleets, and directing the operations of both—should exist “without limitation” because “[t]he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed” (111).

Although the framers of the Articles of Confederation realized this, they failed to grant the federal government the necessary authority to carry out these duties effectively. Whereas the federal government of the Confederation requisitions soldiers and men through state quotas (an arrangement shown to be a failure in Federalist No. 22) the government of the proposed Constitution would be empowered to levy troops and marshal supplies directly, enforcing its laws on individuals rather than on the states.

Hamilton discusses provisions found in state constitutions of Pennsylvania and North Carolina recommending that standing armies should not be maintained during times of peace because they are “dangerous to liberty.” He goes on to explain why a similar provision is not found in the US Constitution under consideration for ratification. For one, Britain and Spain each hold territory adjacent to the United States, and it is possible that the pair may become allies in the future.